



MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
BRAZILIAN ARMY
15TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE
(2ND GROUP OF THE
FRONTIER/1971)
(GUARANI BRIGADE)

OPERATION PARANA III





TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	2
2.	GENERAL SITUATION	3
3.	ANNEX 1 – CURRENT SITUATION.....	5
4.	ANNEX 2 – CURRENT SITUATION (CONTINUED)	
5.	ANNEX 3 – CURRENT SITUATION (CONTINUED).....	7
6.	ANNEX 4 (D-16).....	10
7.	ANNEX 5 (D-13).....	12
8.	ANNEX 6 (D-12).....	16
9.	ANNEX 7 (D-11).....	27
10.	ANNEX 8 (D-10).....	29
11.	ANNEX 9 (D-8).....	33
12.	ANNEX 10 (D-6).....	42
1.	TERRAIN	42
2.	WEATHER (D-2 TO D+5).....	44
3.	MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS.....	45
4.	AREA OF INTEREST	47
5.	POLICE, FIRE AND KEY INFRASTRUCTURE.....	52
6.	COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTIC, FEEDING AND LODGING CAPABILITIES.....	64
7.	KEY ORGANIZATIONS.....	67
8.	POPULATION	70
9.	SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES	74
13.	POINTS OF CONTACT	76



1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

a. The conquest and subsequent colonization of South America was marked by the arrival, occupation and establishment of colonies by Portugal and Spain, global economic powers of the time. This resulted in the predominance of the Portuguese and Spanish languages in the region.

b. The independence process for the countries situated in the South American Continent resulted from a series of events that took place throughout the 18th century. During this time, a rise of new values that directly challenged the colonial pact and the authoritarianism of monarchies took place.

c. The influence of Enlightenment ideas resulted in the end of colonization, adding to the difficult work routine of the native indigenous population, slaves and those of mixed races, and also contributed to the independence process of the countries located on the South American continent.

d. In the beginning of the 19th century, most countries had become independent, partially contributing to the establishment of country borders in South America.

e. The relationship between South American countries has been harmonious and is evident through their cooperation initiatives and peaceful interactions. Its psychosocial profile has been influenced by indigenous, European and African peoples' regional cultural practices.



2. GENERAL SITUATION

(Hypothetical)

South America is comprised of fourteen countries, totaling approximately 17,850,568 square kilometers. It is bordered to the east by the Atlantic Ocean and to the west by the Pacific Ocean.



In its south-central region is the country of YELLOW which shares a land border with Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina.

With its capital in the city of FOZ DO IGUAÇU (Iguacu Falls), YELLOW has suffered negative impacts on its economy over the past two years. With a stable political situation, it is led by a democratically elected President; however, it has experienced a degradation in the capabilities of its Armed Forces, Police and Civil Defense Force. On D-22 it experienced heavy winds and rains that increased the human suffering of the population of YELLOW.



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 4 of 79)



Figure - Political Map of YELLOW





3. **ANNEX 1 - CURRENT SITUATION**

a. On A-2, YELLOW experienced heavy rains that resulted in the largest flooding event in its history. Approximately 5% of the territory of YELLOW was flooded due to the rising of the PARANÁ River, resulting in the loss of over 20% of its agricultural production. In addition, roads in the Central and Northern Regions were severely affected, increasing the country's "cost of production" by about 23%.

b. The economic slowdown in YELLOW directly impacted its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Human Development Index (HDI).

c. On A-1, YELLOW's government reduced payments to its civil servants, causing a stoppage of several essential services. As a result, the dissatisfaction of the populace began to increase due to the lack of services from the country, especially in the health, education and public safety sectors., causing negative effects on the microeconomy of the interior cities

d. Additionally, those from the social classes with greater economic influence, such as small-town shop and supermarket chain owners, began a small migration to BRAZIL and PARAGUAY

e. Throughout the northern to the southern regions of the country the flow of internally displaced persons (IDPs) began. Searching for new opportunities, thousands of people began to move to the cities located along Highway 277 because it is the most developed economic area and has the most employment opportunities. However, the housing infrastructure in this region cannot absorb the demand, resulting in unorganized population concentrations and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in several parts of southern YELLOW.



4. **ANNEX 2 - CURRENT SITUATION (CONTINUED)**

a. On M-11, after almost a year of successive pay cuts, prison officers abandoned their posts and, in some cases, released the prisoners who were in custody.

b. The pay cuts also affected the Armed Forces and police, as well as other security agencies, causing a large exit of the low-level staff of these institutions.

c. On M-10, YELLOW was identified by the United Nations as a state facing imminent economic collapse. This caused a national supply crisis, triggering the rupture of several essential systems and causing a large amount of social animosity - with several aggressive protests held throughout the country.

d. Since M-8, the progressive reduction in the capacities of the Armed Forces and Police resulting from the deterioration of the country's socio-economic situation, enabled the emergence of gangs that have since operated with great freedom of action in several interior locations.

e. From M-7 onwards, some cases of gang confrontations fighting over territorial dominance were reported in the interior. The territorial disputes intensified the debate over the issue of the government's ability to provide security to the population and, consequently, provoked protests on social media focused on the need for "self-defense" groups.

f. Beginning on M-6, the "self-defense" groups began to intensify their actions in some neighborhoods by throwing grenades and openly carrying military weaponry, mostly at night.

g. On M-5, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) issued a report indicating several social vulnerabilities in YELLOW. This reported highlighted the threat of a crisis resulting a lack of potable water, the risk of child malnutrition, a mass population migration, the separation family members and the recruitment of minors to participate in armed groups.



5. ANNEX 3 – CURRENT SITUATION (CONTINUED)

a. On D-22, due to a new wave of heavy rains and winds of more than 80 km/h, the PARANÁ River reached a new elevation record, flooding 15% of the territory of YELLOW. Several ports and old fishing spots were also affected. The southern portion of FOZ DO IGUAÇU saw landslides and several flooded areas, requiring a greater concentration of Civil Defense and Public Security resources to respond in the Capital.

b. The effects of the strong wind and rains had a greater impact on the IDP Camps, damaging their makeshift tents and making the situation of the homeless even more serious.

c. The rains also reduced YELLOW's logistical capacity, reducing its ability to run on dirt roads. In addition, several food storage sheds were flooded, causing significant losses in food production.

d. On D-21, small IDP camps began to appear along several of YELLOW's highways, leading to reports of people intending to migrate to BRAZIL and PARAGUAY.


e. On D-20, in the area surrounding the province of MISSAL, a region greatly affected by the floods, over 250 families occupied private land located on higher ground surrounding the developed areas. Some landowners raised concerns about this illegal occupation to the government of YELLOW and requested compensation from the government.

f. On D-19, some gas stations, hospitals, shops and markets were looted along the routes that connect MISSAL to the Capital.

g. On D-18, it was observed that the absence of trash collection and its accumulation on the sidewalks had blocked rainwater drainage canals, increasing flooding. The blocking of drainage canals increased the health risk in YELLOW, especially in the IDP camps within MISSAL and some other areas in the interior of the country.



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 8 of 79)



h. On D-17 the President of YELLOW declared a state of national disaster and issued an official letter to the Organization of the States of the Americas (OEDA- (Fictitious Organization)) declaring a serious limitation of its ability to protect its citizens and requested support for the eventual need to establish security and augment its Disaster Response capabilities.

i. On D-16, with the consent of YELLOW's congress, OEDA Resolution 0922 (See the Annex 4) was approved by the Security Council with the main objective of coordinating efforts in Disaster Support Operations, while focusing on the protection of the country's civilian populace.

j. On D-15, in response to YELLOW's request for assistance, the security council of the OEDA, voted to provide military support to assist with the crisis in the country.

k. On D-14, the OEDA member countries' embassies were notified. The information was then immediately passed on to the respective countries' Ministries of Foreign Affairs.



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 9 of 79)



- l. On D-13, the OEDA sent a Memorando de Entendimento (Memorandum of Understanding – MOU) (See Annex 5) in support of YELLOW.
- m. On D-12, the OEDA sent an Acordo sobre o Status da Força (Status of Force Agreement - SOFA) (See Annex 6) in support of YELLOW.
- n. On D-11 the National Congresses of ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, MEXICO, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SPAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND URUGUAY (countries participating in the exercise) approved sending military support in response to the crises in YELLOW.
- o. Also, on D-11, the Relatório Preliminar (Preliminary Report) of ORCAP YELLOW (See Annex 7) was sent.
- p. On D-10 the Conceito Estratégico da Operação Militar (Strategic Concept of Military Operations) for the mission of the OEDA in support of the declaration of disaster in YELLOW (See Annex 8) was sent.
- q. On D-9 in CURITIBA (BRAZIL), the Combined Joint Command for the Support of YELLOW was activated.
- r. On D-8 the Plano Operacional (OPLAN) of the Combined Joint Command for the Support of YELLOW was sent (see – Annex 9)
- s. On D-7 the mobilization of troops to support YELLOW began.
- t. On D-6 the Relatório de Situação (SITREP) of ORCAP YELLOW (See Annex 10) was sent.



6. **ANNEX 4 (D-16)**

Resolution 0922 of the ORGANIZATION OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAS

Referring to resolution 46/182 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, with a focus on strengthening the coordination of the United Nation's systems for emergency humanitarian assistance.

Referring also to its resolution 2816 (XXVI) from December 14, 1971 and its subsequent resolutions and decisions with respect to humanitarian assistance, including UN resolution 45/100 of December 14, 1990.

Referring also to UN Resolution 44/236 from December 22, 1989, the annex of which is the International Framework for Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.

Deeply concerned about the suffering of victims of disasters and emergencies, the loss of human life, the outflow of refugees and their displacement and the destruction of material goods.

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of YELLOW, as well as all states in the region, and emphasizing the need to fully respect the principles of non-interference, good neighborliness and regional cooperation.

Stressing that the Government of YELLOW has the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including protecting them from crimes against humanity.

Remaining deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation that continues to seriously affect the civilian population, particularly in the south-central portion of YELLOW, with more than 200,000 IDPs and refugees attributed to the degradation of infrastructure and the supply chain in the region.

Calling on YELLOW and all states in the region to work towards a peaceful environment that will lead to lasting solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons, including their eventual voluntary return and reintegration, with the support of the United Nations national team.



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 11 of 79)



Supporting the current efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and calling on all armed groups disturbing public order in YELLOW to respect the impartiality, independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors.

Considering the seriousness of the report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in line with the formal request for aid and stabilization issued by the YELLOW Government, decides:

1. Request the states located close to the emergency zones to participate closely in international cooperation efforts with the affected country in order to facilitate, as far as possible, the transit and deployment of military resources in support.

2. Request YELLOW to facilitate the provision, by the various organizations, of humanitarian assistance, especially the provision of food, medicines, shelter and medical care, for which access to victims is essential;

3. Request that contributions for humanitarian assistance be made in a way that does not undermine the resources available for international development cooperation;

4. Request that the cooperation be conducted in accordance with international law and the national laws of YELLOW. Governmental and non-governmental organizations that act impartially and with strictly humanitarian purposes should continue to contribute to the task of complementing the efforts of the supported country.

5. Request OEDA countries to cooperate with Military resources to complement humanitarian efforts, to be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding and Status of Force Agreement.



7. **ANNEX 5 (D-13)**

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

(EXTRACT)

1. **MISSION**

The OEDA, through the CEA, shall establish a Disaster Support Operation (OACD) in YELLOW, cooperate with the YELLOW Government in complementing or supplementing its logistical and security capabilities, with the intention of promoting the alleviation of human suffering. and raising public safety levels to allow for the conduct of governmental and non-governmental Humanitarian Aid.

2. **PURPOSE AND E SCOPE**

The OEDA, through BRAZIL, will employ a Component Naval Force and a Component Air Force and, through the CEA, a Brigade-level Component Land Force, in a combined manner, in order to complement the Civil Defense capabilities, promoting protection of civilians and the guarantee of human rights, always with the consent of YELLOW.

The main objective is to complement the capacities in logistics, health and safety, at a time when YELLOW is hit by heavy rains that harmed several infrastructures and reduced several national capacities, keeping the State as the main body responsible for assistance to the population and provider of public security. Of YELLOW, through its Civil Defense, Military Police and Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces, under the aegis of the OEDA, will fulfill their mission respecting the domestic legislation of the affected country and the agreements, treaties and agreements in force, mainly bilateral treaties between the countries, delivering an efficient, fast and punctual response to the population of YELLOW.



The employment costs of each supporting army will be the responsibility of the State itself.

3. **RESPONSIBILITIES**

YELLOW should organize a National Emergency Operations Center (COEN) to coordinate, at the governmental level, all actions and all contributions from contributing countries. The Support Coordinating Organization (ORCAP), in turn, should organize a structure to coordinate all Civil-Military support actions in the event of a disaster.

The YELLOW ORCAP shall guarantee to the personnel of the Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA, the rights and procedures regarding the benefits and provisional benefits in the event of death or accident in the accomplishment of the mission or for any other cause, in accordance with the legislation of its respective countries.

The YELLOW ORCAP will coordinate with the corresponding national authorities the procedures to facilitate the entry and exit procedures to the national territory, customs and tax exemptions for the personnel and logistical means of the Support Executing Unit (UNEJAP), including transit, deployment and employment.

The YELLOW ORCAP must:

a. Maintain close links with national governmental and non-governmental organizations related to the OACD. Likewise, the elements of another country that provide assistance will receive the information through the army of the affected country.

b. Provide the necessary information in the general area of employment in order to facilitate the work of the OACD, if applicable, highlighting an O Lig for the Component Forces.

c. Provide the necessary information for the elaboration of the situation chart, including meteorological forecast, cartography, hydrographic, volcanic, climatic behavior, according to the type of disaster and state of roads and communication routes in the area of operations and accesses.



- d. Provide information on the situation of violence in the general area of employment, in order to avoid difficulties in the development of the OACD.
- e. and. Coordinate all Civil-Military activities that take place in the disaster area.
- f. Provide security to personnel participating in the OACD.
- g. Maintain the functioning of the SICOCEA Network (Alternative Communications Network of the CEA) for use in the OACD.
- h. Establish a Communications Network, enabling contact between Government Authorities, YELLOW Security Forces, YELLOW Civil Defense, YELLOW Firefighters, Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Agencies in support, and Military Units under the aegis of the OEDA in support.
- i. Monitor the situation on an ongoing basis.
- j. Designate permanent links for coordination with the bodies involved in the mission.
- k. Determine the level of responsibility of the units involved.
- l. Establish employment priorities according to the situation.
- m. Carry out permanent diagnoses through recognition and reports.
- n. Determine national-level risk areas or zones.
- o. Coordinate future tasks on a daily basis according to the assessment of the situation.
- p. Provide the Supporting Military Units with the location of other committed military units and NGOs that carry out search, rescue, rescue and humanitarian aid tasks, in order to facilitate the necessary coordination.

4. TERMS OF UNDERSTANDING

The Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA that participate in OACD must apply the parameters and procedures established by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 46/182 of the United Nations General Assembly of 1991), which apply to operational scopes, given the similarity of missions developed



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 15 of 79)



by the UN, as provided for in the CEA Disaster Relief Operations Procedures Guide, 2009 edition.

In the event of violations or infractions of a common nature to the legal system of the assisted country, by one or more members of the Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA who participate in an OACD, the Commander of the unit must deal with the situation generated on the basis of the legal system of that country. If the problem deals with violations or infractions of a typically military nature, the process will be carried out in accordance with the legislation and jurisdiction of the country of origin of the causer.

The duration of the support will be linked to the intention and capacity of each supporting army or to the notification by the YELLOW Government on the adequacy of its capacities to face the established crisis, that is, the termination of the demand for external assistance.



8. **ANNEX 6 (D-12)**

STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENT (D-12)

(EXTRACT)

1. **PURPOSE E SCOPE**

The purpose of this agreement is to regulate the use of armies from friendly countries in support of YELLOW, as well as the entry and circulation in YELLOW territory and the use of weapons for individual and collective protection, always with the agreement of the parties involved.

2. **DEFINITIONS**

The Disaster Support Operation (OACD) consists of the use of the Armed Forces in assisting civilian or military bodies, in the fulfillment of their respective attributions, in the internal or external scope. It encompasses, in addition to general subsidiary attributions, those of a humanitarian nature, military assistance to other states, the evacuation of non-combatants and the rescue of injured personnel, spoils or sensitive equipment.

Integrated protection is the term used to encompass all the measures necessary to protect society, including: guaranteeing constitutional powers and rights, guaranteeing law and order, acting in the border area, protecting strategic structures and damage control actions. The Armed Forces' participation in these activities may be restricted by their constitution and laws, but these activities are essentially interagency.

Support Executing Unit (UNEJAP) is the term used to identify military organizations external to the supported country that are deployed in coordination with the Support Coordinating Organization (ORCAP) of the supported country.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (CVRD) is a treaty adopted on 18 April 1961 by the United Nations Conference on



Diplomatic Relations and Immunities, which met at the Hofburg Imperial Palace in Vienna, Austria, from March 2 to April 14 of that year. It represents a successful effort to codify the branch of international law relating to the rights and duties of States in the conduct of diplomatic relations between them, including regulating the privileges and immunities enjoyed by officials in diplomatic missions.

Responsibility to Protect is a global political commitment endorsed by all United Nations Member States at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Affected Country Mission Coordinator is the integrator of the techniques and means assigned to the affected army, being appointed by the affected country. This should preferably be a General Officer with mastery in OACD, Civic-Military Operations, mastery of the English language and knowledge in the policies and direction of the country's higher authority.

3. PRIVILEGES, EXCEPTIONS AND IMMUNITIES

All personnel sent by the Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA in support of YELLOW shall enjoy privileges, exceptions and immunities equivalent to those agreed for technical and administrative support of a diplomatic mission pursuant to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.

In the event of violations or infractions of common nature to the legal system of the assisted country, by one or more members of the Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA who participate in an OACD, the Commander of the unit must deal with the situation generated on the basis of the legal system of that country. If the problem deals with violations or infractions of a typically military nature, the process will be carried out in accordance with the legislation and jurisdiction of the originator's country of origin.

4. ENTRY, EXIT AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION

YELLOW should:



a. Provide migratory and customs facilities (land, air and/or sea) to support troops.

b. Through your Military Police or corresponding authority, ensure that your national authorities, especially those of borders and public security, at all levels, are informed of the arrival of troops in support, specifying entry roads, proximities and sectors of unfolding.

c. Provide supporting troops with the necessary information about the disaster in order to facilitate their employment and designate the mission to be accomplished.

UNEJAP and UNEJAP members may enter YELLOW territory when properly identified for collective or individual movement, the latter when in possession of a travel order certified by UNEJAP and ORCAP.

UNEJAP will have freedom of movement throughout the territory and access to public structures in YELLOW, when deemed necessary to fulfill the agreed support, maintaining close coordination with ORCAP.

5. **LICENSES**

All professional licenses valid in the UNEJAPs (Support Executing Unity) providing countries will be accepted and recognized in YELLOW during the execution of the support mission.

6. **UNIFORMS AND WEAPONS**

Personnel and means of units of the Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA, operating in support of YELLOW, may carry weapons for individual use, weapons for collective use in vehicles (on board) and non-lethal weapons for the control of civil disturbances.

Vehicles and uniformed personnel must be identified with the indication OEDA.



7. AIRWAYS

Air resources must be dedicated to:

- a. Search, save and rescue.
- b. Evacuation of people in high-risk areas.
- c. Damage assessment in disaster zones.
- d. Air transport of people and supplies.
- e. Fighting forest fires

In order to fulfill the aforementioned missions, the following policies must be established:

- a. The Air search, rescue and rescue operations, as well as forest fire fighting, will only be carried out during daytime periods.
- b. For the evacuation of people from high-risk areas, helicopters will preferably be used.
- c. The aforementioned missions will be carried out in accordance with the capabilities of the available air assets.
- d. In the event of an air accident, assistance will be provided in accordance with established international standards.

In relation to air resources, the supported country must:

- a. Report your situation through ORCAP.
- b. Report information on airports available for aircraft to contributing countries.
- c. Inform about the location of the Command and Control Post and logistical support centers.
- d. Granting and granting registered aircraft overflight and landing permissions in the YELLOW territory.
- e. Respect the safety rules of the air units, both on the ground and in flight, as well as the technical restrictions of the aircraft of the country that assists.



f. Provide security at facilities, air bases, airstrips and heliports that are employed by air units.

g. Provide the air component of the country it supports with air navigation charts and maps that are necessary for the planning and execution of air operations.

h. Provide the flight crews of the supporting country with information on radio frequencies, callsigns and, when necessary, compatible teams for coordination with surface units.

In relation to air resources, the supporting country must:

a. The. Request the corresponding overflight and landing permits at least 24 hours in advance.

b. Respect the civil aviation laws and regulations of the affected country.

c. Comply with the administrative and operational provisions of the air commander of the affected Country, which do not interfere with the safety on the ground and in flight of the air units.

d. Solve the technical or maintenance problems of your aircraft.

e. Ensuring that flight crews comply with established flight safety standards.

f. Provide technical information and capabilities of the air assets that will be used.

g. Provide information on crews and personnel who will participate in air operations.

8. **AMPHIBIOUS MEANS**

The main missions of amphibious assets will be the following:

a. Search, save and rescue.

b. Evacuation of people in high-risk areas.

c. Transport of humanitarian supplies.



The areas where amphibious missions are being executed will be those which are flooded in urban and/or rural areas and in the river and lake area.

Regarding amphibian organization, the ORCAP of YELLOW:

a. It will work with the competent authority of its country, which is the authorization for navigation, over jurisdictional waters and will also provide the necessary permissions for every type of mission, vessel, navigation route and estimated time.

b. It will assign a Liaison Officer to facilitate port services required by the amphibious component in support, and it will also provide assistance to shore features, nautical charts, hydrographic information, enabled radio stations, lighthouse list and aids to navigation, navigable inland waterways, navigable river and lake network of the general disaster area.

It will be amphibious unity's responsibility to help solve technical and maintenance problems of their means.

9. DUTIES AND TAXES

Supporting countries will be exempt from all customs duties and federal YELLOW taxes.

10. SECURITY

The UNEJAP is responsible for providing security on the perimeter of military bases during displacements and during operations in support.

11. PUBLIC SECURITY

The Military Police or the military and/or police organization performing the mentioned functions in YELLOW, will be responsible for the physical security of the members, as well as the physical means, beats, vehicles, machinery and facilities of the units of the Component Land Force under the aegis of OEDA (Member Armies of the CAA) that are participating in OACD in said country.



The Army Police or the military and/or police organization of the Component Land Force units under the aegis of the OEDA (Member Armies of the CAA) of each contributing country, which performs the aforementioned function, will ensure compliance with the laws of the assisted country and will adopt measures to guarantee order and discipline among the members of the unit, and must collaborate with its respective Commander and with the authorities of the common forum, if they so request, in the investigation of any military crime presumed to have been committed by or against a member of the troop.

12. CONTRACTING PARTY AND CONTRACTED PARTY

Legal norms and civil/labor rights in force in YELLOW must be respected. Fees or taxes linked to private contracts must be suppressed in order to foster the restructuring of the critical capacities of YELLOW.

13. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The Component Land Force Integrated Communications System under OEDA, through the CAA (SICOCEA), shall consist of:

- a. CEA Information System Network (REDCEA).
- b. HF radio network (between countries in case of communications failure).

The ORCAP of the affected country must provide the means of communication for general coordination purposes, as well as the authorization of frequencies for the use of internal means of communication.

14. COMMUNICATION

The fundamental principle is the right of the community to receive information, since the duty of the authorities is to inform. However, the right to information is not absolute: the concept of open doors does not imply that the community has the right to receive all information, since there will be information that, due to its



importance and significance, should not be disclosed in order to avoid negative social impact.

The YELLOW ORCAP must appoint a Media Officer (spokesperson) to interact with the press and provide official information about the operations and other support measures to the affected community.

The Armed Forces of supporting countries may appoint a Media Officer in charge of the same function above, restricted to the operations developed by each Component Force.

15. HEALTH SUPPORT BY MILITARY PERSONNEL

The field hospital to be deployed in support of the requesting country should, in addition to the ability to perform vaccination and offer medicines, contain, at a minimum, the following facilities:

- a. Classification;
- b. Major and minor surgery;
- c. General medicine;
- d. Basic medical care;
- e. Epidemiology.
- f. Evacuation

16. DEATH OR INJURY IN THE LINE OF DUTY

The ORCAP of the affected country shall guarantee to the personnel of the Armed Forces under the aegis of the OEDA, the rights and procedures regarding benefits and provisional benefits in case of death or accident in the line of duty or from any other cause, in accordance with the legislation of their respective countries.

17. DEPLOYMENT OF THE SUPPORTING MISSION

Considering that the Component Land Forces under the aegis of OEDA involved in OACD are supporting with constituted troops, they will begin their



deployment to the affected country, where they will be at the disposal of the affected country's ORCAP for employment requests and coordination.

During this phase, the ORCAP of the affected country shall:

- a. Provide migration and customs facilities (via land, air, and/or sea) to supporting troops, both in the transit Countries and in the affected Country.
- b. Through its Military Police or corresponding authority, ensure that its national authorities, especially border and public security authorities at all levels, are informed of the arrival of the troops in support, specifying roads of entry, vicinity, and sectors of deployment.
- c. Provide the troops in support with the necessary information about the disaster in order to facilitate their employment and designate the mission to be accomplished.

18. CONDUCTING THE SUPPORT MISSION

Once the mission is received, the troops in support will begin its operations and will send the weekly operations report to ORCAP of the affected country for monitoring.

The supporting troops will establish their internal communications network and they will participate in the ORCAP's communications network.

The UNEJAP must conduct a Preliminary Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (DRA) in the affected area and report to the ORCAP.

The Armed Forces members under the aegis of the OEDA in support must meet the following standards for action during the performance of OACD:

- a. Respect the customs, religions, and traditions of the place.
- b. Demonstrate, at all times, respect for people, especially women, the elderly, and children.
- c. Take care of personal presentation.
- d. Treat people in an appropriate manner.
- e. Do not appropriate people's belongings from the place.



- f. Do not visit places that do not comply with the status of soldier member of an international contingent.
- g. Not to ingest alcoholic beverages, drugs, or any type of narcotics.
- h. Demonstrate politeness and courtesy to all persons.
- i. Maintain an appropriate vocabulary.
- j. Comply with command instructions regarding dealing with the press.
- k. Do not ask or accept rewards from people for work performed.
- l. Do not abuse the hospitality of the local people.
- m. Respect the graves, tombs, churches and other buildings that the community members respect.

19. DEMOBILIZATION OF THE SUPPORT MISSION

The ORCAP of the affected country, through its Military Police or corresponding security force, will provide physical security through escorts to the UNEJAP moving to the different exit points.

They will also provide migratory and customs facilities to the UNEJAP that are moving (by land, air and/or sea).

The UNEJAP commanders will prepare a final operations report, which will be submitted by the Liaison Officer to the ORCAP.

20. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

All disputes will be resolved exclusively by consultation between the parties, or their designated representatives, and will not be referred to any national or international court, tribunal or similar body, or any third party for resolution, unless otherwise mutually agreed.



21. DURATION AND CLOSURE

This agreement must remain in place, unless the UNEJAP contributing country wishes its exclusion or YELLOW manifests the suppression of the post-disaster crisis.



9. ANNEX 7 (D-11)

EXTRACT FROM YELLOW ORCAP PRELIMINARY REPORT

1. SAFETY

a. Part of the population has been looting convoys of donations on the highways that connect the capital (FOZ DO IGUAÇU) to the interior of the country, that is the reason why most of the means of the Public Security Organs (PSO) in YELLOW are being allocated in the South of the Country.

b. The prioritization of PSO means to the south is triggering a wave of looting in the interior, particularly nearby MISSAL, MEDIANEIRA, and SÃO MIGUEL DO IGUAÇU.

c. YELLOW territory, in its urbanized areas, is being dominated by gangs and self-defense militias, with occasional friction between armed groups over territorial disputes and areas of influence.

2. HEALTH

a. The interruption of some power lines has reduced the capacity of health care facilities in the country, keeping in operation only the large private hospitals that run on generators.

b. A cholera outbreak is suspected in a displaced population camp in the north of the country but has not yet been confirmed by health authorities.

3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

a. Cellphone network is fully functional on the main roads; however, heavy rains have disabled several antennas, creating communication shadows.

b. Communication via SICOCEA is active, as is REDCEA, but only in the capital.



4. SOCIAL MEDIA

a. Social networks have functioned as a sensor of some areas affected by the rains and of the actions of public order disturbances.

b. Self-defense groups in the countryside have used the network to coordinate security.

c. Hate speech has been gaining space in the discussions, with a focus on the portion of the population that has come out in YELLOW, which has been classified as anti-patriotic.

5. DONATIONS

a. The donations have been arriving mainly through the capital's airport, in addition to the highways that connect to BRAZIL and PARAGUAY.

b. Humanitarian agencies already deployed have reported that the volume of food donations has been greater than the organizations' capacity to catalog, store and distribute food.

6. POPULATION MOVEMENT

A portion of the population with greater purchasing power, faced with social instability in YELLOW, began a prominent migration to BRAZIL and PARAGUAY. In this sense, the PARAGUAYAN Security Agencies identified more than three thousand cars crossing the Paraguayan border and the BRAZILIAN Security Agencies identified more than five thousand cars passing through the Brazilian customs control.



10. ANNEX 8 (D-10)

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE CEA SUPPORT MISSION IN CASE OF DISASTER IN YELLOW

1. REFERENCES

- a. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991;
- b. OEDA Resolution 0922 of D-16;
- c. EMCDDA Memorandum of Understanding of D-13; and
- d. OEDA Status of Force Agreement of D-12.
- e. Extract from ORCAP YELLOW Preliminary Report of D-11.

2. INTRODUCTION

Two years ago, YELLOW was hit by heavy rains and went through a process of degradation of its organic capacities for civil defense and public security. In D-22, another wave of strong winds and heavy rains saturated YELLOW's disaster response capabilities, leading it to request international support from the Organization of States of the Americas (OEDA).

After the political negotiations on the use of International Armed Forces to support YELLOW were completed, the Memorandum of Understanding was issued in D-13 and the Status of Force Agreement of OEDA in D-12, which, together with the preliminary report of the Support Coordination Body of YELLOW, formed the basis for the formulation of this strategic concept.

3. SITUATION

YELLOW concentrated its means of public security, civil defense, and armed forces in the capital city (FOZ DO IGUAÇU), causing a deficit in the state's presence in the other regions.



Two years before, the rains have degraded roads, logistical structures, and people, initiating a supply crisis that was accompanied by an economic crisis. Such conditions motivated the population flow to more developed regions and to neighboring countries.

The capital of YELLOW, a region with better infrastructure and that keeps its international airport running, has received a lot of international support from UN agencies and NGOs.

The insecurity perceived by the population has encouraged the structuring of self-defense groups in several locations, mostly with unregistered firearms.

Although the rain has been the trigger for the supply crisis and the deterioration of infrastructure, the actions of gangs have aggravated the human suffering of the population of YELLOW. Cases of urban violence and public disturbance are intensifying due to the absence of policing in the countryside.

4. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

a. Physical:

The western portion of YELLOW, lower relief (250m to 300m) has been flooded, isolating people and damaging structures.

Gangs clash with self-defense groups.

b. Informational:

Some media sources have incited social instability. A small portion of displaced people intend to emigrate.

c. Human:

The displaced population has not had its basic needs met.

Part of the population is vulnerable to various diseases caused by the lack of sanitation.



5. MEANS TO BE DEPLOYED

- a. COMBINED JOINT FORCE, with Command Post in CURITIBA-BR
 - 1) FNC Command Post in SÃO PAULO-BR;
 - 2) FTC Command Post in CASCAVEL-BR;
 - 3) FAC Command Post in CURITIBA-BR;
- b. Contributing Countries:

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, SPAIN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, MEXICO, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, and URUGUAY.

6. COOPERATE WITH THE OEDA

- a. Armed Forces, Public Security Forces, and Civil Defense in YELLOW;
- b. United Nations agencies in YELLOW;
- c. International Organizations in support of YELLOW; and
- d. Governmental and non-governmental Humanitarian Organizations.

7. OBJECTIVE

To cooperate with the Government of the country in complementing or supplementing its logistical and security capabilities in order to promote the relief of human suffering and raise levels of public safety

8. IMPLEMENTATION

The Military Component **will contribute** to stabilizing the crisis in YELLOW, **reestablishing** the lines of communication that directly interfere with logistics and health, **providing** immediate support to the population affected by the rains and **reinforcing** the actions of the responsible YELLOW agencies, in order to **create conditions** for YELLOW to restructure its capabilities to assist and protect its population.



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 32 of 79)



9. **DESIRED END STATE**

Population of YELLOW assisted and country stabilized in the shortest term.



11. 9TH PARTICULAR SITUATION (D-8)

OPERATIONAL PLAN OF THE YELLOW OPERATIONS THEATER PARANÁ PLAN (Extract)

1. ORGANIZATION BY TASKS

a. Naval Force Component

- Naval District Means
- 04 Patrol Vessels in Foz do Iguaçu
- 01 Hospital Ship in Foz do Iguaçu
- 02 Patrol Ships in Guaíra

b. Component Ground Force

- Cmdo and Cia Cmdo
- 115th BIMec Cbn
- 116th BIMec Cbn
- 8º Esd C Mec (BR)
- 16º Esqd C Mec (BR)
- 115th Cia Eng Mec (BR) - 115th Cia Com Mec (BR)
- 115th B Log (BR)
- 3º BAvEx (BR)
- 1st Cia As Civ (BR)
- Dst Intlg (BR)
- DAC (BR)
- Dst Op Psc (BR)
- Dst CBRN (BR)



c. Air Force Component

Transportation:

HEADQUARTERS	UNIT	ALLOCATION	REGISTRATION
1º/20º GT	CURITIBA	02 KC-390	VRV 8201 e 8202
5º/20º GT	FLORIANÓPOLIS	02 C-105	VTA 8411 a 8419

2. SITUATION

a. Threats

- Agents disturbing the Public Order, according to ORCAP's preliminary report.

b. Friendly Forces

- Armed Forces and Police from Yellow; and
- Civil Defense from Yellow.

c. Basic Assumptions

- YELLOW is favorable to the performance of Cmdo Cj Cbn troops in its territory;
- The laws, precepts, rules and regulations of YELLOW should be respected by the troops of Cmdo Cj Cbn.

3. MISSION

In order to contribute to the stabilization of the crisis of YELLOW, conduct Operation Disaster Support, from D+1, in the Area of Operations PARANÁ, reestablishing the lines of communication that directly interfere in logistics and health, providing immediate support to the population affected by the rains and reinforcing the actions of the responsible agencies of YELLOW, in order to create conditions for YELLOW to restructure its capabilities to assist and protect its population.



4. EXECUTION

a. Commander's Intent.

My intention is to conduct the operation within strict compliance with the legal precepts of the YELLOW country. One must work in an integrated manner in an interagency environment in order to obtain the unity of effort, necessary to reestablish the structures of YELLOW.

The desired end-state is the reestablishment of normalcy in YELLOW, with the population assisted, public order reestablished, the actions of agents disturbing public order reduced, problem areas controlled, sensitive areas monitored, and the image of the Cj Cbn Cj before the local population strengthened.

b. General Concept

The C Cj Cbn will conduct Disaster Support Operations, in A Op PARANÁ, from D+1 of 2022. To do this, it will have the operational resources of the Combined Component Forces necessary to accomplish the mission, with eventual support from the YELLOW Armed Forces. It will integrate the efforts of the Public Security Agencies and other agencies. The actions will occur in five phases, as follows:

1) Phase 1 (STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION).

a) Objectives of the Phase:

- Conduct the strategic concentration in CURITIBA-BR, CASCAVEL-BR, CIUDAD DEL LESTE-PY, PUERTO IGUAZÚ-AR, FOZ DO IGUAÇU-AM AND GUAÍRA-AM;
- Carry out Op Info; and
- Establish links with the agencies of A Op PARANÁ.

b) Concept of Operation.

- The FNC will concentrate its resources in FOZ DO IGUAÇU-AM;
- The FTC Cbn will concentrate its resources in CASCAVEL-BR and CIUDAD DEL LESTE-PY and will disseminate the operations and capabilities of our Forces, in order to show credibility to the population of YELLOW.
- The FAC will support, from now on, the strategic concentration of the means of the FTC Cbn.



3) Synchronization of Actions

.....

4) Operational Activities

.....

5) Means

.....

6) Effectiveness Indicators

.....

c. Phase 2 (DISASTER EVALUATION)

1) Phase Objectives:

- Conduct reconnaissance of the area affected by the disaster;
- Survey the needs and perform the adequacy of forces;
- Carry out the necessary coordination with civil bodies and agencies; and
- Carry out Op Info.

2) Concept of Operation.

- The FNC will perform health support in FOZ DO IGUAÇU-AM and establish liaison with civilian agencies and organs.
- The FTC Cbn will conduct reconnaissance of the Op; disseminate the operations and capabilities of our Forces in order to show credibility to the population of YELLOW and establish links with civilian agencies and organs.
- The CAF will support humanitarian logistics with its air assets.

3) Synchronization of Actions

.....

4) Operational Activities

.....

5) Means

.....

6) Effectiveness Indicators

.....

d. Phase 3 (DEVELOPMENT)



1) Phase Objectives:

- Carry out the deployment of FCte Cbn in the PARANÁ Area of Operations;
- Consolidate links with civilian organs and agencies;
- Establish the logistical flow; and
- Carry out Info Operations

2) Concept of Operation:

- The FNC will deploy its Ship in Foz do Iguaçu.
- The FTC Cbn will deploy its resources in Missal and Guaíra; it will establish the logistical flow and carry out the institutional dissemination of the actions carried out and consolidate links with civilian bodies and agencies.
- The CAF will support humanitarian logistics with its airborne resources.

3) Synchronization of Actions

.....

4) Operational Activities

.....

5) Means

.....

6) Effectiveness Indicators

.....

e. Phase 4 (HUMANITARIAN AID IMPLEMENTATION)

1) Phase Objectives:

- Contribute to the stabilization of the crisis in YELLOW;
- Reestablish the lines of communication that directly interfere in logistics and health;
- Provide immediate support to the population affected by the rains;
- Reinforce the actions of the agencies in YELLOW; and

2) Concept of the Operation:

- The FNC will provide health support to the local population through the hospital ship.
- The FTC Cbn will re-establish the safe and stable environment; support re-establishment of essential services; re-establish landlines of communication;



will mitigate the damage caused by the rains and provide support to the IDP camps.
- The CTF will consolidate the flow of donations with its air assets and support the transportation of IDPs and refugees.

3) Synchronizing Actions

.....

4) Operational Activities

.....

5) Means

.....

6) Effectiveness Indicators

.....

f. Phase 5 (NORMALIZATION)

1) Phase Objectives:

- Create conditions for YELLOW to restructure its capabilities to assist and protect its population.

2) Concept of Operation:

- The F Cte Cbn will provide support for the resumption of economic activities and the resumption of essential services by bodies and agencies of YELLOW.

3) Synchronization of Actions

.....

4) Operational Activities

.....

5) Means

.....

6) Effectiveness Indicators

.....

g. Phase 6 (REVERSION)

1) Phase Objectives:

- To carry out the reversal.

2) Concept of Operation:



- Continue standardization tasks;
- Carry out the transition to YELLOW bodies and agencies;
- Return to the initial device; and
- Mdt O, perform demobilization.

4.1. COMPONENT NAVAL FORCE

a. Phase 1 (STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION)

- 1) Carry out the strategic concentration of river resources in the TO; and
- 2) Conduct Info Op in the TO.

b. Phase 2 (DISASTER ASSESSMENT)

- 1) Survey the flooded areas; and
- 2) Establish liaison with civilian bodies and agencies.

c. Phase 3 (DEPLOYMENT)

- 1) Deploy the naval health resources in FOZ DO IGUAÇU-AM;
- 2) Consolidate liaisons with public safety agencies and civilian agencies; and
- 3) Continue to carry out the Op Info.

d. Phase 4 (IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN AID)

- Establish health support in the capital.

4.2. COMBINED COMPONENT LAND FORCE

a. Phase 1 (STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION)

- 1) Concentrate resources in CASCAVEL-BR and CIUDAD DEL LESTE-PY; and
- 2) Carry out Op Info in TO.

b. Phase 2 (EVALUATION OF THE DISASTER)

- 1) Obtain superior information of YELLOW;
- 2) Conduct reconnaissance of the A Op; and
- 3) Establish liaisons with civilian bodies and agencies.

c. Phase 3 (DEPLOYMENT)

- 1) Deploy its resources in Missal and Guaíra;
- 2) Establish the logistical flow;
- 3) Carry out the institutional disclosure of the actions carried out; and
- 4) Consolidate the links with civilian bodies and agencies.



d. Step 4 (EXECUTION OF HUMANITARIAN AID)

- 1) Restore the safe and stable environment;
- 2) Support the restoration of essential services;
- 3) Restructure terrestrial communication lines;
- 4) Mitigate the damage caused by the rains; and
- 5) Provide support to displaced people camps.

e. Step 5 (NORMALIZATION)

- 1) Continue to restore a safe and stable environment;
- 2) Complete the restoration of essential services;
- 3) Transfer control of the stabilized area to the YELLOW region Public Power; and
- 4) Support the resumption of economic activities.

f. Step 6 (REVERSAL)

- 1) Perform the reversal of your means.
- 2) Continue the standardization tasks;
- 3) Carry out the government transition; and
- 4) By means of order, carry out the demobilization.

4.3 COMPONENT AIR FORCE

a. Step 1 (STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION)

Support, right away, the strategic concentration of Land Force Component assets.

b. Step 2 (DISASTER ASSESSMENT)

- Support humanitarian logistics with your air assets.

c. Step 3 (DEPLOYMENT)

- Support humanitarian logistics with your air assets.

d. Step 4 (EXECUTION OF HUMANITARIAN AID)

- Consolidate the flow of donations with its air resources; and
- Support the transport of displaced persons and refugees.

e. Step 5 (NORMALIZATION)

.....

f. Step 6 (REVERSAL)

- Support the reversal of the means of the Joint Land Force Component.



5. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

.....

6. COMMAND AND CONTROL

.....

7. PERSONNEL

.....

8. INFORMATION OPERATIONS

a. Generalities

.....

b. Information Support Operations

.....

c. Electronic Warfare

.....

d. Cyber Defense

.....

e. Prescriptions

.....

9. CIVIL AFFAIRS

.....

10. FINAL PROVISIONS

Dealing with the population and civilian property must be strictly in line with what regulates the International Law of Armed Conflicts. Special attention is required to the integrity of the civilian population and to the preservation of built-up areas, historical, cultural and religious sites.

Major General
Joint Commander



12. 10th PARTICULAR SITUATION (D-6)


SITUATION REPORT - ORCAP

(SOURCE: ORCAP YELLOW)

1. TERRAIN

a. Vegetation

The Seasonal Semideciduous Forest (Seasonal Forest) is found in the YELLOW State and in the valleys of the rivers that form the Paraná River basin. The plant formations of this unit have semideciduousness as their main physiognomic characteristic, in the unfavorable season. In addition to the eventual occurrence of frosts, the flora is conditioned to a period of low rainfall, when 20 to 50% of the trees in the forest lose their leaves, strongly modifying the physiognomy of the vegetation. This phenomenon is practically restricted to the upper strata (taller trees).




b. Topography

The YELLOW area relief structure is the basaltic plateau. This plateau formed by successive volcanic spills is the largest relief unit of YELLOW region covering about 95% of the country's area. In it, we find volcanic formations in addition to Paleozoic sandstones. This plateau has a smooth and sloping relief to the west, ranging from 1200 meters east to 300 meters west. It is on this plateau that the

“purple land” is found, an extremely fertile soil resulting from the erosion of volcanic stones. Despite not having so many sedimentary rocks on the surface.

c. Soil Nature

In the SOUTH region, NITOSOILS + LATOSSOILS predominate and in the NORTH region, LATOSSOILS + ARGISSOILS predominate.



Legenda

Classificação		
AR+RL - AFLORAMENTOS DE ROCHAS + NEOSSOLOS LITÓLICOS		C+L - CAMBISSOLOS + LATOSSOLOS
G+O - GLEISSOLOS + ORGANOSSOLOS		C+N - CAMBISSOLOS + NITOSSOLOS
RY - NEOSSOLOS FLÚVICOS		L - LATOSSOLOS
RL+RR - NEOSSOLOS LITÓLICOS + NEOSSOLOS REGOLÍTICOS		L+C - LATOSSOLOS + CAMBISSOLOS
E - ESPODOSSOLOS		L+P - LATOSSOLOS + ARGISSOLOS
P - ARGISSOLOS		N - NITOSSOLOS
P+N - ARGISSOLOS + NITOSSOLOS		N+RL - NITOSSOLOS + NEOSSOLOS LITÓLICOS
C - CAMBISSOLOS		N+L - NITOSSOLOS + LATOSSOLOS
C+RR - CAMBISSOLOS + NEOSSOLOS REGOLÍTICOS		GZ - GLEISSOLOS SÁLICOS
		Corpos de Água



d. Hydrography

Conditioned by topography and geological units, the hydrography of YELLOW has 92% of its territory, tributaries of the Paraná River Basin.

The Paraná River is the main watercourse with a length that varies from 900 m to 5 Km. It is navigable on the Itaipu Lake, with restrictions only during periods of drought. Its access to the North is limited by dams without locks in the Brazilian portion of this watercourse.

Regarding lakes, dams and canals, the Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant lake stands out (25° 37' 43.26" S - 52° 36' 50.78" W) (Simulating flood areas for exercise purposes).

e. Works of Art

ITAIPU is a binational hydroelectric power plant located on the Paraná River, on the border between YELLOW and Paraguay. Built by both countries in the period from 1975 to 1982, Itaipu is today the largest power plant in the world and responsible for 100% of the electric power of YELLOW.

The dam is the largest hydroelectric operating unit in terms of annual power generation. Its lake has an area of 1.350 square kilometers, extending 150 kilometers North from FOZ DO IGUAÇU, in YELLOW, and CIUDAD DEL ESTE, in PARAGUAY, to GUAÍRA-AM and SALTO DEL GUAIRÁ-PY.


f. Transportation Routes

In YELLOW, the BR-277 connects CASCAVEL/BR to ASSUNÇÃO/PY, Passing through the capital FOZ DO IGUAÇU/YELLOW. The areas of continuous passage in FOZ DO IGUAÇU, over the International Friendship Bridge (25° 30' 34,45" S - 054° 35' 53,10" W), and over the Itaipu HPP dam are highlighted. The Fraternity International Bridge or Tancredo Neves Bridge (25° 35' 13,49" S - 054° 33' 45,41" W) also stands out, which makes the connection with ARGENTINA through the city of PUERTO IGUAZU/ARGENTINA.

2. WEATHER CONDITIONS (D-2 TO D+5)

a. Average temperature of 14°C, with a minimum of 4°C and a maximum of 18°C.

- b. Winds:
- 1) Winds up to 20Km/h, NW - SE direction until D+3.
 - 2) Winds up to 80Km/h, NW - SE direction on D+4.
 - 3) Winds of up to 10Km/h, NW - SE direction by D+5.
- c. Rainfall:
- 1) Rainfall of up to 80mm on D+3.
 - 2) Rains of up to 200mm in D+4.
 - 3) No rain forecast at D+5



3. MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS

- a. Highway
- 1) Highway 163 between NOVO HORIZONTE and MERCEDES blocked due to the poor state of conservation of the road.
 - 2) Highway 589 in the section between NOVO SARANDI and NOVA SANTA ROSA blocked due to the actions of the RUBINS Gang that control the region




OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 46 of 79)



and prevent the passage of unauthorized vehicles.

3) Highway 182 near PÉROLA INDEPENDENTE blocked due to the heavy rains that made this highway restrictive.

4) Highway 467 between the towns of TOLEDO and QUATRO PONTES is in very bad traffic conditions due to the lack of conservation of the highway and the heavy rains that have affected the region.



b. River

As mentioned before, there is a forecast of Winds up to 80Km/h, NW - SE direction on D+4, which if confirmed will make navigation on the country's rivers difficult.



c. Airport

As mentioned before, there is a forecast of Winds up to 80Km/h, NW - SE direction on D+4, which if confirmed will make it difficult to access the country's airports.

4. AREA

a. Political-administrative division

1) YELLOW has its territory divided into the Northern, Central and Southern regions, being subdivided into provinces.

b. Areas of high economic value

1) The areas of greater economic value are in the axis of the Rv 277, either for the deposits of the agricultural production, or for being the main axis of communication between BRAZIL and PARAGUAY.

2) The Region of GUAÍRA, in the North portion, for being leaned on the triple frontier, PARAGUAY - AMARELAND - BRAZIL, has its commerce favored and, consequently, its economy developed.


c. Political Centers of Government:

The Political Center of Government is its capital. In FOZ do IGUAÇU is the Defense Headquarters, besides all the ministerial and administrative structure.

d. Culturally important areas:


The country YELLOW is highlighted by its natural beauty such as the Iguaçu Falls, the Itaipu Lake and the ancient region of the Seven Falls.

In the Capital, the religious diversity stands out, marked by the presence of churches, Buddhist temples and mosques.



e. High crime areas.

Currently, two major criminal factions operate in an organized fashion in the country, maintaining mutual respect within their agreed-upon territorial boundaries. The LAVRADIUS faction is active predominantly to the south, in the province of FOZ DO IGUAÇU, focusing on international drug trafficking, and the RUBINS faction is active to the north, predominantly in the province of GUAÍRA, focusing on international arms trafficking.




More recently, with the absence of the state in the interior, self-defense groups (●) and gangs (●) have been disputing areas of dominion in the central region of the country, and South, often being observed ostensibly carrying weapons restricted to the Armed Forces.



f. Commercial and smuggling routes.

The main commercial routes coincide with the main smuggling routes, being used as the main means of illicit transit by RUBINS and LAVRADIUS, to the North (Rv272) and South (Rv277), respectively.




g. Possible sites for use as temporary areas for refugees and IDPs.

The urbanized areas and surroundings of the provinces of SANTA TEREZINHA DE ITAIPU, SÃO MIGUEL DO IGUAÇU, MEDIANEIRA, MATELÂNDIA, CÉU AZUL and SANTA TEREZA DO OESTE are the most favorable to receive migration flows, both for displaced people and for groups with intention to migrate.

h. Flooded areas

The areas most affected by the rains are on the western edge of YELLOW, with MISSAL province being the hardest hit.





5. STRUCTURE

a. Armed Forces Command Post

The Defense Command (Yellow Armed Forces) is located in the Capital (21JYM 42711-73774), as well as the National Emergency Operations Center (COEN), where the Support Coordinating Body (ORCAP) operates.

Currently, the only constituted unit of the ground force and in full operation is the 1st Border Battalion, in the province of GUAIRA (21JYP7809833825).

b. Public Security (police stations, courts of justice, penitentiaries, roadblocks and control posts).

1) Civil Police Stations:

- a) Foz do Iguaçu: Active
- b) São Miguel do Iguaçu: Inactive (21JYM7825893092)
- c) Medianeira: Inactive (21JYM9210499340)
- d) Santa Helena: Active (21JYN6956547955)
- e) Toledo: Active (22JBT2332961448)

2) Military Police:

- a) São Miguel do Iguaçu MP Company: Inactive (21JYM7732793567)
- b) 1st Military Police Battalion of Marechal Cândido Rondon: Inactive (21JYN9320080993)
- c) 2nd Military Police Battalion of Umuarama: Active (22KBU6474969149)

3) Fire Department:

- a) Foz do Iguaçu: Active (21JYM4238472802)
- b) São Miguel do Iguaçu: Inactive (21JYM7725493554)
- c) Medianeira: Inactive (21JYM9186698635)
- d) Saint Helena: Active (21JYN6971147584)
- e) Toledo: Active (22JBT2129663245)









4) Prison system

a) National Prison: Active with limitations (21JYM4974876659)

b) Northern Regional Prison: Active with limitations
(21JYP8022429293)

c) Southern Regional Prison: Active (21JYM9053598689)

c. Bridges

Structure	Location	Remark
Bridge in São Miguel do Iguaçu	21JYN7943706486 	Flooded Access 
Bridge on Rdv 277 near MEDIANEIRA	21JYN9888503655 	Functional
Bridge on Rdv 495 over the Ocoí River	21JYN8436111505 	Functional
Bridge on Rdv488 in Santa Helena	21JYN7106153718 	Flooded Access 

d. Ports and airports of entry.

1) Dry Port in Cascavel (BR):

- a) Location: 22JBT 66800-33695
- b) Conventional warehouse for general cargo with 2,000 m²;
- c) Refrigerated chamber for cargo inspection by MAPA;
- d) Administrative structures for Dry Port, MAPA and Revenue
- e) Storage and transshipment of grains by road and rail;
- f) Parking yard for 70 trucks (being expanded); and
- g) Phytosanitary treatment of agricultural products.

2) Dry Port of Foz do Iguaçu (AM):

- a) Location: 21JYM 44732-76258
- b) Total area of 150,000 (one hundred and fifty thousand) m²;
- c) Area occupied by warehouses 2,000 (two thousand) m²; and
- d) Parking spaces for vehicles: 750 (seven hundred and fifty) vehicles.



3) Cascavel Airport (BR)

- a) Location: 25° 0'7.80"S 53°30'11.22"O
- b) Companies: AZUL, GOL e LATAM
- c) Flights to: Curitiba, Campinas e São Paulo (BR)
- d) Category: AP-1
- e) Runway dimensions: 1.780 x 45 meters
- f) Night operations: Yes



- g) Runway covering: Asphalt
 - h) Road Resistance: 48/F/B/X/T
 - i) Contact: aviacao@redcea.com
- 4) Airport of Toledo (AM)
- a) Location: 25° 0'7.80 "S 53°30'11.22 "W
 - b) Companies: AZUL
 - c) Flights to: Campinas (BR)
 - d) Category: AP-1
 - e) Runway dimensions: 1670 x 30 meters
 - f) Night operations: Yes
 - g) Runway covering: Asphalt
 - h) Road Resistance: 33/F/C/X/U
 - i) Contact: aviacao@redcea.com
- 5) International Airport of Foz do Iguaçu (AM)
- a) Location: 25° 36' 01" S 54° 29' 06" W
 - b) Companies: AVIANCA, AZUL, GOL, LATAM
 - c) Flights to: 54 destinations- list of flights available at <https://pt.flightaware.com/live/airport/SBFI>
 - d) Category: AP-2
 - e) Runway dimensions: 2858 x 45 (the longest runway in the country)
 - f) Night Operations: Yes
 - g) Runway covering: Asphalt
 - h) Road Resistance: 51/F/B/X/T
- 6) Contact: aviacao@redcea.com Cataratas del Iguazú International Airport (AR)
- a) Location: 25° 44' 14" S 54° 28' 24" W
 - b) Companies: AEROLÍNEAS ARGENTINAS, AVIANCA ARGENTINA, LAN ARGENTINA, ANDES LÍNEAS AÉREAS, FLYBONDI, HI FLY.
 - c) Flights to: <https://www.aeroportosdomundo.com/br/aeroporto-IGR-partidas/>



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 56 of 79)




- d) Category: AP-2
- e) Runway dimensions: 3300 X 45 m
- f) Night operations: Yes
- g) Runway covering: Asphalt
- h) Road Resistance: 52/F/B/X/T
- i) Contact: aviacao@redcea.com

7) International Airport Guaraní (PY)

- a) Location: 25° 27' 19" S 54° 50' 36" W
- b) Companies: LADESA, ARPA
- c) Flights to: ASUNCIÓN, MONTEVIDEO
- d) Category: AP-1
- e) Runway dimensions: 3400 X 45m
- f) Night operations: Yes
- g) Runway covering: Asphalt
- h) Road Resistance: 51/F/B/X/T
- i) Contact: aviacao@redcea.com


e. Power stations and substations.

1) Power Plants






2) Substations



3) Transmission lines



f. Most relevant gas stations in the Southern Region.

Structure	Structure	Structure
NOVO PAMPA GAS STATION, CASCAVEL	22JBT4320630504	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10.000 L Alcohol • 10.000 L Gasoline • 10.000 L Diesel
STOP STATION	22JBT4326127550	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5.000 L Alcohol • 15.000 L Gasoline • 10.000 L Diesel



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 58 of 79)



SHELL GAS STATION	22JBT1527717915	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 15.000 L Diesel
LAR BOA VISTA GAS STATION	22JBT1528417911	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 5.000 L Gasoline• 20.000 L Diesel
BORSATO GAS STATION	22JBT1414616193	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 5.000 L Gasolina• 20.000 L Diesel
DELTA GAS STATION	22JBT1265014696	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 5.000 L Gasoline• 20.000 L Diesel
DOS EUCALITOS GAS STATION	22JBT0360110213	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 10.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 10.000 L Diesel
IPIRANGA GAS STATION	21JYN9349300337	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 15.000 L Diesel
REDE STOP – GAS STATION	21JYM8241895073	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 10.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 10.000 L Diesel
IPIRANGA GAS STATION	21JYM7756393107	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 15.000 L Diesel
IDAZA GAS STATION AND CONVENIENCE STORE	21JYM5944882303	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 10.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 10.000 L Diesel
ACARAY GAS STATION	21JYM5040078372	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 15.000 L Diesel
SHELL GAS STATION	21JYM4942277984	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 10.000 L Alcohol• 10.000 L Gasoline• 10.000 L Diesel



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 59 of 79)



g. Potable water reservoirs and plants.

	Missal			
	Média dos Últimos 30 Resultados	Mínimo / Máximo Permitido (Legislação)	Unidade	Data da Análise
Cor	2,50	15,0	uH-Un.Cor	D-20
<small>A cor de uma água é consequência de substâncias dissolvidas. Na maioria dos casos estas substâncias são de natureza orgânica proveniente de matéria vegetal (folhas) em decomposição, e/ou pela presença de partículas inorgânicas (ferro, manganês, etc) finamente divididas e dispersas na água. A cor é um parâmetro de aspecto estético de aceitação ou rejeição do produto. Pela Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor máximo permitido para a cor aparente na rede de distribuição é de 15 uH (Unidade de Hazen).</small>				
Fluoretos	0,8	0,6 a 1,1	mg/L F	D-20
<small>De acordo com Lei Federal as águas de abastecimento público devem ser fluoretadas. A introdução de íons de fluoretos em águas de abastecimento tem a finalidade de prevenir a cárie dental. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor máximo permitido para os íons de fluoretos na rede de distribuição é de 1,5 mg/l.</small>				
Turbidez	0,28	5,0	NTU	D-20
<small>Turbidez é a medição da resistência da água à passagem da luz. A turbidez é provocada pela presença de partículas suspensas, finamente divididas ou em estado coloidal. Assim como a Cor, a Turbidez também é um parâmetro de aspecto estético de aceitação ou rejeição do produto. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor máximo permitido para a rede de distribuição é de 5,0 NTU (Unidade Nefelométrica de Turbidez).</small>				
pH	9,19	N/D****	---	D-20
<small>É a medição da acidez, neutralidade ou alcalinidade. Os valores do pH encontram-se distribuídos entre zero e 14. Entre zero e 7 encontra-se a faixa ácida, o ponto 7 indica neutralidade e a faixa de 7 a 14 encontra-se a faixa alcalina. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor mínimo recomendado é 6,0 e o valor máximo é 9,5 Unidade de pH</small>				
Cloro Residual	1,37	0,2 a 5,0	mg/L Cl	D-20
<small>A permanência de um residual de cloro na água assegura a manutenção da qualidade microbiológica, desde o ponto de tratamento até o ponto de consumo. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o teor mínimo de cloro residual livre em qualquer ponto da rede de distribuição deve ser de 0,2 mg/l e o valor máximo permitido de cloro livre em água potável é 5,0 mg/l.</small>				
Alumínio**	0,009	0,2	mg/L Al	D+20
<small>Presente na água podem provocar precipitações e sedimentações, alterando a qualidade estética da água. É necessário ao metabolismo humano nutricional. O resultado da análise de alumínio é expresso em mg/l. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor máximo permitido para o alumínio é de 0,2 mg/l.</small>				
Ferro**	0,003	0,3	mg/L Fe	D+20
<small>Presente na água podem provocar alterações na qualidade estética da água. É necessário ao metabolismo humano nutricional. O resultado da análise de ferro é expresso em mg/l. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor máximo permitido para o ferro é de 0,3 mg/l.</small>				
Manganês**	0,001	0,1	mg/L Mn	06/06/2022
<small>Presente na água podem provocar alterações na qualidade estética da água. É necessário ao metabolismo humano nutricional. O resultado da análise de manganês é expresso em mg/l. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o valor máximo permitido para o manganês é de 0,1 mg/l.</small>				
Microcistinas***	-	1,00	ug/L	
<small>Microcistinas são substâncias químicas (toxinas) produzidas por cianobactérias e que podem ser altamente tóxicas para plantas, animais e humanos. As hepatotoxinas podem causar diarreias, vômitos, diminuição dos movimentos e hemorragia interna. O limite máximo permitido para água de consumo humano desta substância é de 1 mg/l, conforme a Portaria vigente.</small>				
Coliformes Totais	0,36	(0) Ausente	NMP/100mL	D+20
<small>Os coliformes totais é parâmetro de avaliação da integridade do sistema de distribuição. O grupo coliforme é o indicador ideal para monitorar a potabilidade da água para consumo humano e verificar a eficácia da cloração. As bactérias do grupo coliformes constituem um grupo de organismos com características comuns. De acordo com a Portaria vigente do Ministério da Saúde o resultado de deve apresentar ausência em 100 ml da amostra.</small>				
Escherichia Coli	0,19	(0) Ausente	NMP/100mL	D+20
<small>A Escherichia coli é o mais específico indicador de contaminação fecal, sendo a sua presença indicativa da provável ocorrência de organismos patogênicos. Na análise que acusa a presença de E.Coli, ainda não indica necessariamente água contaminada por bactérias patogênicas ou outros vírus, mas a probabilidade é</small>				




The Missal reservoir, one of the main water reservoirs in YELLOW area, presented the following result in the last report commissioned to verify the water quality:

In this sense, it is observed that the water in that reservoir is not in conditions of consumption, causing risks to the health of the population.

h. Sewer systems (underground)

The interruption in waste collection increased the volume of garbage in the streets that, with the rains, blocked the rain channels, increasing the risk of floods in the provinces of SÃO MIGUEL DO IGUAÇU, ITAIPULÂNDIA, MEDIANEIRA and MISSAL





OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 61 of 79)



i. Hospitals and Health Support.

Structure	Location	Observation
USER ASSISTANCE SERVICE	21JYM 5916482222	
MADRE DE DIO HOSPITAL	21JYM 7750792913	
SÃO CARLOS HOSPITAL	21JYN 9236100545	
MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL COMPLEX	21JYM 7754594329	
FIELD HOSPITAL MSF (TOLEDO)	22JBT2717666845	



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 62 of 79)



j. Churches and places of religious worship:

Foz do Iguaçu	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Buddhist temple- Omar Ibn Al-Khatrab Mosque- Saint John Baptist Cathedral- Church of Saint Paul the Apostle- Três Lagoas Baptist Church
Medianeira	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Our Lady Medianeira Parish- Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church- Church of Saint Christopher- Holy Family Community of Nazareth- Medianeira Presbyterian Church- Church of God Is Love
Missal	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Our Lady of Conception Parish- Foursquare Missal Church- IBBN Missal- Universal Church- Truth Church



	- Universal Church of the Kingdom of God
--	--

Contact us: religiao@redcea.com

k. Popular markets and trading centers.



Due to the economic crisis, there was a great growth in informal trade across the country, as shown in the image below.

I. Inactive Schools

Structure	Location	Observation
New Millennium School	21JYN7780128326	Capacity to accommodate 50 people
Olavo Bilac School	21JYN7866021043	Capacity to accommodate 30 people



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 64 of 79)



Reborn School	21JYN7618823034	Capacity to accommodate 20 people
Father Eduardo Michelis School	21JYN7762622253	Capacity to accommodate 20 people
Teotonio Vilela School	21JYN7228139623	Capacity to accommodate 15 people
Castelo Branco School	21JYN6969347952	Capacity to accommodate 15 people
Tancredo Neves School	21JYN6917146959	Capacity to accommodate 15 people
WEST Educational Center	21JYM7776393809	Capacity to accommodate 80 people
Creative Education School	21JYM7794493899	Capacity to accommodate 30 people (Private)
Angelo Darolt School	21JYN9273700456	Capacity to accommodate 80 people
Alberto Santos Dumont School	22JBT2447063108	Capacity to accommodate 80 people
WEST University	21JYN9893580811	Capacity to accommodate 15 people
Leonilda Papen School	21JYN8757792748	Capacity to accommodate 15 people
Paulo Freire School	22KBU6387471606	Capacity to accommodate 80 people

6. CAPACITIES

a. Communication:

Antenna (TV, Radio and Cell Phone)	Location	Situation
---	-----------------	------------------




OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 65 of 79)



A1	21JYM5244379578	On
A2	21JYM6026982402	On
A3	21JYM8244994791	Off (Copper wire theft)
A4	21JYM9208998254	On
A5	22JBT0020504653	On



b. Transport logistics and storage:

Structure	Location	Image
HS LOGISTICS AND STORAGE	21JYM5169978947	




OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 66 of 79)



TRANSLI - LOGISTICS SOLUTIONS	21JYM5147279046	
c. Food and Supply.		
Structure	Location	Image
LAR AGROINDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE	22JBT1600718305	
FRIMESA - DAIRY INDUSTRIAL UNIT	22JBT0152205733	
NINFA FOOD INDUSTRY	21JYN9635702232	
MAX MEDIANEIRA WHOLESALE	21JYN9365500590	
COLD STORAGE FRIELLA	21JYN7984913181	
LAR AGROINDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE	21JYM7724594239	



DAIRY COSTA	21JYN8395911939	
-------------	-----------------	---

d. Accommodation

Structure	Location	Observation
Toledo Gymnasium	22JBT2340058838	Capacity to accommodate 300 people, electrical network, internet access, FM and AM radio signal, and 100% indoor.
Oliveira Castro Gymnasium	21JYP7756614905	Capacity to accommodate 100 people, electrical network, internet access, FM and AM radio signal, and 100% indoor.
Guaira Gymnasium	21JYP7800733334	Capacity to accommodate 200 people, electrical network, internet access, FM and AM radio signal, and 100% indoor.
Palotina Gymnasium	22JBU1137211014	Capacity to accommodate 150 people, electrical network, internet access, FM and AM radio signal, and 100% indoor.
Céu Azul Stadium	22JBT1164014766	Open-air area, favorable for setting up tents and parking vehicles. Damaged electrical network.

7. ORGANIZATIONS

a. class unions.

The most prominent union in the country is that of civil and military police, having already led demonstrations and strikes for salary increases and better working conditions.

b. criminals.

Organized Crime has two factions, RUBINS with drug trafficking, sexual exploitation and human trafficking in the North and LAVRADIUS with trafficking in weapons, ammunition and chemical defensives in the South.

Criminal organizations found in the systemic crisis installed in the YELLOW region an opportunity to expand their areas of influence and, consequently, the profitability of their products.

c. International Communities

Brazilian, Paraguayan and Argentine Red Cross (<https://www.ifrc.org/es>)

d. International Governments.

- 1) International Committee of the Red Cross (<https://www.icrc.org/pt/acoes>)
- 2) OCHA (<https://www.unocha.org/>)
- 3) UNHCR (<https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do.html>)
- 4) UNHCHR (https://www.ohchr.org/en/ohchr_homepage)
- 5) UNICEF (<https://www.unicef.org/what-we-do>)
- 6) IOM (<https://www.iom.int/>)
- 7) FAO (<https://www.fao.org/home/en>)
- 8) WFP (<https://www.wfp.org/>)





e. Non-Governmental

- 1) Doctors Without Borders (<https://www.msf.org.br/quem-somos/>)
- 2) *Action Contre La Faim (ACF)*

(<https://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/>)

f. COEN e ORCAP - Limitations:

- 1) Limited capacity to prepare the situation map, including meteorological forecast, cartography, hydrographic and climatic behavior, depending on the type of disaster and the state of roads and communication routes in the area of operations and access.
- 2) Limitations in providing security to personnel who participate of the OACD.
- 3) Restrictions to keep the SICOCEA Network functioning in YELLOW territory.
- 4) Reduced capacity to monitor the situation permanently.
- 5) Limitations to carry out permanent diagnoses through acknowledgments and reports.
- 6) Unavailability of means to provide security in facilities, air bases, landing strips and heliports that are used by UNEJAP air units.



8. POPULATION

a. Society:

Some media have been encouraging social friction between the part of society that had the financial means to migrate to neighboring countries and the part that remained in the YELLOW region, highlighting the lack of patriotism and leading parts to hate speech.

The national and international appeal for donations has opened up opportunities for several cybercrimes.

Some gangs already carry out recruitment campaigns on social media and WhatsApp closed groups.

b. Security:

Due to the reduction of capillarity in the use of public security forces in the interior of the country, several cases of violence against women and children were reported by international NGOs.

The security of the population has been deteriorating in the last two years, which has favored the emergence of self-defense groups.

The popular allegation about the inefficiency of the police and of the legal system itself has increasingly motivated the organization of self-defense groups, mainly to generate capacity to face the gangs.

In the midst of the crisis and due to the prioritization of police means for the Capital, police agencies in the interior were deactivated. This fact contributed to the disbelief in the ability of the government to act against organized crime and gangs, which spread fear among many citizens.

The supply crisis generated great food insecurity, confirming the risks of aggravation of cases of malnutrition and child malnutrition, pointed out by specialized international agencies.

Rumors about a possible outbreak of cholera are another factor of fear for the population. Many people complain about the lack of information on the topic and the inaction on the public health system.



The growing level of unemployment, associated with the closure of several private initiatives, has caused uncertainty in the salaried classes. Such fear has increasingly stimulated the search for new opportunities in Brazil and Paraguay, increasing the migratory flow to these two countries.

Another social vulnerability falls on the residents in the camps of displaced persons who are threatened to leave the occupied lands. Owners of occupied land upon having the claim for compensation by the government denied.

c. Economic Resources

The uncertainty of the economy's ability to recover in YELLOW country caused a significant outflow of foreign exchange and consequent increase of inflation and devaluation of the local currency.

The floods that occurred in the country impacted the productive capacity of the agriculture sector in the YELLOW country in such a way that there was an expressive devaluation of food on the market. The lack of means to drain the production of perishable foods combined with excess moisture in the grains made that the quality of export products was severely depreciated, causing massive indebtedness in the main sector of the country's economy.

Informal commerce, tax defaults and high public spending in support of the population get out of the control of the Government's accounts, causing delays in the payment of civil servants and public debt.

d. Languages and Dialects Spoken by the Population

The official language of YELLOW country is Portuguese, however, the Spanish language is widely used on the border with PARAGUAY AND ARGENTINA.

e. Availability of Education

The education system, despite the crisis experienced, works partially. The lack of access to education is most prominent in the camps for the displaced persons, where no system has yet been implemented to support or encourage continuity in the educational process.

f. Media



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 72 of 79)



The main means of communication, despite the small shadows in the cell phone and internet coverage, is the cell phone, through message like Whatsapp and Telegram.

Social interactions predominantly occur on Facebook and Twitter.

The main local radios are FM 102.7 and FM 101.5.

There are two major TV stations, TV MARROM and TV GUAÍRA.

TV MARROM has adopted approaches that stimulate social friction, eventually projecting “fake news” and disinformation. Your profile has attacked the government and public institutions with biased reporting that explores the government failures.

The BROWN media campaign has motivated popular demonstrations aggressive actions, positively reinforcing the actions of gangs and groups of self-defense.

g. The availability of weapons to the general population

Access to firearms by self-defense groups began with desertion processes from the armed and police forces, as a result of late payment. In a second moment the weapons began to be acquired in the illegal Market, through connections with the faction.

h. Refugees and displaced people

Displaced people camp	Location	Observation
IDP 1	21JYN7210588856	- 51 families - 8 unassisted children - 3 pregnant women - 5 families with suspected cholera - 3 families with immigration purpose
IDP 2	21JYP7565532949	- 111 families - 3 unassisted children - 17 families with COVID-19 - 44 families with immigration purpose



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 73 of 79)



		- Presence of money extortion by the Lavradios and sexual exploitation
IDP 3	22JBT6160195748	- 87 families - Presence of money extortion by the Lavradios and sexual exploitation
IDP 4	21JYN6839547732	- 40 families - Santos self-defense group presses the displaced people to the area to be abandoned
IDP 5	21JYN6720824360	- 202 families with suspected cholera - Flooded area
IDP 6	21JYN9260402207	- 23 families - Organized crime influence (Rubins)
IDP 7	21JYN7985708458	- 10 families without immigration purpose.
IDP 8	21JYM8053694781	- 115 families - Organized crime influence (Rubins)
IDP 9	21JYN7944420913	- 62 families - Under peer pressure Maldaner self-defense so that families flee the region
IDP 10	22JBT3560126980	- 33 families - Organized crime influence (Rubins)
IDP 11	22JBT2689565930	- 70 families - 8 pregnant women

i. Isolated families

Location	Houses/Isolated families
21JYN7287548958	02 Houses/Families
21JYN7171290589	01 Houses/Families
21JYP7793635088	02 Houses/Families
21JYN7313609051	20 Houses/Families
21JYN7446508028	05 Houses/Families



21JYN6726307835	02 Houses/Families
21JYN5975009887	02 Houses/Families

9. EVENTS

a. National and Religious holidays

National holidays are of a religious nature, primarily Christian.

In 2022, the commemorative date of the independence of YELLOW country stands out, which will be 200 years old on September 17.

b. Agricultural crops/stock and production cycles

Agricultural production and harvest cycles were severely disrupted by the rains. The production storage structures supported by the secondary roads were seriously affected, with the axle structures of the Rv 277 the ones that kept their original capabilities.

The production flow capacity was directly affected by the degradation of the rolling capacity of the highways in the interior, in the face of the strong rains of D-22.

The increase of rodents in the silos was another point related to the rains and with the floods, contributing to the increase of the complexity in the maintenance of stocks and also impacting public health.

c. Elections

The last electoral cycle took place in A-2, and had its president elected democratically. In M+3, the application processes for the leaders of the provinces of YELLOW country will start. Even if not yet authorized by YELLOW's electoral system, some veiled campaigns and the association of votes to the offer of help to the homeless and displaced people has been observed, mainly in the southern region.

d. Public Disturbances

Events	Location	GDH
Convoy assault	21JYM7970494177	0110h/D-21
Convoy assault	21JYM7916094938	0430h/D-3



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 75 of 79)



Convoy assault	21JYM7903394026	1330h/D-11
Convoy assault	21JYM8049694617	1700h/D-13
Cargo Robbery 01	21JYM7635199914	2230h/D-4
Cargo Robbery 02	21JYN7748002445	1200h/D-15
Cargo Robbery 03	21JYM7632295810	2130h/D-7
Cargo Robbery 04	22JBT2570863539	2300h/D-20
Cargo Robbery 05	22JBU1122335758	0000h/D-25
Cargo Robbery 06	21JYM7635199914	0230h/D-15
Cargo Robbery 07	21JYN7653200698	0530h/D-9
Cargo Robbery 08	21JYN7906805137	0330h/D-10
Hand Grenade Explosion	-25.099064, -54.240082	2000h/D-6
Hand Grenade Explosion	-25.097003, -54.242129	0500h/D-5
Car Robbery	-25.095129, -54.244242	0900h/D-29
Car Robbery	-25.093780, -54.244787	1900h/D-22
Hand Grenade Explosion	-25.096929, -54.247724	Não confirmada
Car Robbery	-25.090457, -54.247045	0400h/D-20
Car Robbery	-25.099610, -54.259261	0902h/D-19
Hand Grenade Explosion	-25.087924, -54.256010	Não confirmada
Car Robbery	-25.087278, -54.261065	0300/D-18



10. CEA COMMUNICATION NETWORK

Come into effect: D-2 0000P

a. Functional electronic addresses

Echelon	Function	Electronic Addresses
International Agencies	OCHA	agenciasonu@redcea.com
	UNHCR	
	UNHCHR	
	UNICEF	
	IOM	
	FAO	
	WFP	
	International non-governmental Agencies	ongsinternacionais@redcea.com
International Committee of the Red Cross	comitecruzvermelha.redcea.com	
International Federation of the Red Cross	Argentine Red Cross	ifrc@redcea.com
	Brazilian Red Cross	
	Paraguayan Red Cross	
Yellow Country	Humanitarian Agencies	agenciashumanitarias@redcea.com
	National Government	govamarelo@redcea.com
	Government Agencies	agenciasgovernamentais@redcea.com
	Non-governmental Agencies	ongsamarelo@redcea.com
	Support Coordinating Body	orcap@redcea.com
	Armed Forces	forcasarmadasdeamarelo@redcea.com
	Military Police	
	Fire Department	
	Federal Highway Police	
	Civil Police	
	Private Infrastructure	infraestruturaprivada@redcea.com
	Airports	aviacao@redcea.com
Churches	religiao@redcea.com	



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 77 of 79)



Echelon	Function	Electronic Addresses
Argentina	Argentine Government	govar@redcea.com
Brazil	Brazilian Government	govbr@redcea.com
Paraguay	Paraguayan Government	govpy@redcea.com
Combined Joint Command OEDA	Cmdo Cj Cbn OEDA	cmdocjcbn@redcea.com
Combined Land Forces Command	Cmt FTC Cbn	cmtftccbn@redcea.com
	SCmt FTC Cbn	scmtftccbn@redcea.com
Joint Chief of Staff of the Combined Land Forces	Ch EM Cbn	chemcbn@redcea.com
	D1	d1@redcea.com
	D1.1	d1.1@redcea.com
	D1.2	d1.2@redcea.com
	D2	d2@redcea.com
	D2.1	d2.1@redcea.com
	D2.2	d2.2@redcea.com
	D2.3	d2.3@redcea.com
	D3	d3@redcea.com
	D3.1	d3.1@redcea.com
	D3.2	d3.2@redcea.com
	D3.3	d3.3@redcea.com
	D4	d4@redcea.com
	D4.1	d4.1@redcea.com
	D4.2	d4.2@redcea.com
	D4.3	d4.3@redcea.com
	D5	d5@redcea.com
	D5.1	d5.1@redcea.com
	D5.2	d5.2@redcea.com
	D6	d6@redcea.com
	D6.1	d6.1@redcea.com
	D6.2	d6.2@redcea.com
	D7	d7@redcea.com
	D7.1	d7.1@redcea.com
D8	d8@redcea.com	
D8.1	d8.1@redcea.com	
D9	d9@redcea.com	
D9.1	d9.1@redcea.com	



OPERATION PARANÁ III
RELEASE RESTRICTED UNTIL 12 SEPTEMBER 2022
(OFFICIAL ARMY DOCUMENT - PAGE 78 of 79)



Echelon	Function	Electronic Addresses
	D9.2	d9.2@redcea.com
	D9.3	d9.3@redcea.com
	D9.4	d9.4@redcea.com
	D10	d10@redcea.com
	D10.1	d10.1@redcea.com
Liaison Officers	O Lig Eng 1	olig.eng1@redcea.com
	O Lig Av Ex	olig.avex@redcea.com
	O Lig Eng	olig.eng@redcea.com
	O Lig FAB	olig.fab@redcea.com
	O Lig QBRN	olig.qbrn@redcea.com
	O Lig Sau	olig.sau@redcea.com
	O Ptç Civ	optçciv@redcea.com
	O Op Esp	oopesp@redcea.com
115º BI Mec	Comd 115º BI Mec	115bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 1ª Cia/115º BI Mec	1cia.115bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 2ª Cia/115º BI Mec	2cia.115bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 3ª Cia/115º BI Mec	3cia.115bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 4ª Cia/115º BI Mec	4cia.115bimec@redcea.com
	Comd Cia Ap/115º BI Mec	ciaap.115bimec@redcea.com
116º BI Mec	Comd 116º BI Mec	116bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 1ª Cia/116º BI Mec	1cia.116bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 2ª Cia/116º BI Mec	2cia.116bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 3ª Cia/116º BI Mec	3cia.116bimec@redcea.com
	Comd 4ª Cia /116º BI Mec	4cia.116bimec@redcea.com
	Comd Cia Ap/116º BI Mec	ciaap.116bimec@redcea.com
115ª Cia Eng Mec	Comd 115ª Cia Eng Mec	115ciaengmec@redcea.com
115ª Cia Com Mec	Comd 115ª Cia Com Mec	115ciacommec@redcea.com
115º B Log	Comd 115º B Log	115blog@redcea.com
3º BAvEx	Comd 3º BAvEx	3bavex@redcea.com
1ª Cia As Civ	Comd 1ª Cia As Civ	1ciaasciv@redcea.com
Dst Intlg	Comd Dst Intlg	dstintl@redcea.com
DAC	Comd DAC	dac@redcea.com
Dst Op Psc	Comd Dst Op Psc	dstoppsc@redcea.com
Dst QBRN	Comd Dst QBRN	dstqbrn@redcea.com
Cia Cmdo	Comd Cia Cmdo	ciacmdo@redcea.com

Echelon	Function	Electronic Addresses
15° Pel PE	Comd 15° Pel PE	15pelpe@redcea.com
8° Esqd C Mec	Comd 8° Esqd C Mec	8esqdcmec@redcea.com
16° Esqd C Mec	Comd 16° Esqd C Mec	16esqdcmec@redcea.com

Approved by:

Major General MARCOS AMERICO VIEIRA PESSÔA

Head of the Exercise – PARANÁ Operation III